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Altmann v. Austria and the
Retroactivity of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act
Carlos M.Va¤ zquez*
1. Introduction
The US Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann1 received
a significant amount of attention when it was handed down, perhaps more
because of its interesting facts than because of the rather esoteric ö though
important ö legal issue that it involved. This comment examines the esoteric
legal issue and will accordingly set forth the interesting facts only briefly.
The issue is the applicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA)2 to claims based on events that occurred before the Statute’s enactment.
To decide this question, the Court had occasion to consider the essential
nature of foreign sovereign immunity: is it merely a procedural immunity
providing foreign states with present protection from the inconvenience and
indignity of a lawsuit, or is it something more than that? The Court’s examina-
tion of this question was brief and unsatisfying. Its analysis would have been
enriched by a recognition that foreign sovereign immunity is regulated not just
by a federal statute, but also by principles of customary international law that
the federal statute sought, in large part, to codify.
The defendants in Altmann were the Republic of Austria and the Austria
Gallery, an instrumentality of the Republic. The plaintiff, Maria Altmann, was
a California resident and the sole surviving heir of a man who once owned
several paintings by Gustav Klimt that eventually came into the possession of
the Gallery. Although the Gallery’s possession of the Klimts was alleged to have
resulted in part from Nazi ‘Aryanization’ of occupied Austria, the key allega-
tions of the complaint concerned the Gallery’s failure to return the works
after Austria regained its independence. The Court assumed for purposes of
its analysis that the relevant acts alleged by the plaintiff ö including acts of
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Marc Marinnacio and
Mohsen Manesh for research assistance.
1 124 Supreme Court Reporter 2240 (2004).
2 28 United States Code, xx1602 et seq. (hereinafter FSIA).
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fraud on the part of the Gallery ö took place in 1948. Ms Altmann became
aware of the fraud in 1998, and, after an abortive attempt to raise her claim in
Austria, filed suit in the US District Court for the Central District of California.
Since both defendants were ‘foreign states’, as that term is defined in the
FSIA,3 the plaintiff argued that the suit could proceed if it fell within one of
the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity set forth in section 1605 of the
Act. Ms Altmann argued that her claim fell within the FSIA’s exception for
certain claims involving ‘rights in property taken in violation of international
law’.4 She claimed that Austria’s actions with respect to the Klimts constituted
a taking of her property that violated either customary international law or
the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
which provides that ‘[a]ll seizure . . . of works of art . . . is forbidden, and should
be made the subject of legal proceedings’.5 Austria and the Gallery argued
that the FSIA’s exception for takings in violation of international law was
inapplicable to events that took place in 1948, more than 30 years before the
enactment of the FSIA. This is the so-called ‘retroactivity’ question, which
was the focus of the Supreme Court’s decision, and will be the focus of
this comment.
2. The Retroactivity Issue
The Court of Appeals had effectively avoided the retroactivity issue by conclud-
ing that the defendants would not have been afforded immunity even under
the law as it stood in 1948. According to the Court of Appeals, before the
enactment of the FSIA, a foreign state’s entitlement to sovereign immunity
was determined by the State Department; the judiciary deferred to the ‘case-
by-case foreign policy determinations of the executive branch’.6 The Court
concluded that Austria would not have received immunity under that
approach because the State Department would not have recommended
immunity for acts ‘so closely associated with the atrocities of the War’.7
The Supreme Court clearly rejected an approach that would require
the courts to speculate about what the State Department would have
recommended had the suit been brought before the FSIA’s enactment.8 It is
3 The FSIA defines a ‘foreign state’ to include foreign state instrumentalities, 28 USC, x1603(b).
4 28 USC, x1605(a)(3).
5 ‘Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land’,18 October1907, in C. Bevans
(ed.), Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776^1949
(1 Department of State, 1968) 631, at 653. See Altmann, 124 S. Ct, at 2258 (J. Breyer, concurring
in the judgment).
6 337 F.3d, at 964 (quoting Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (DC Cir. 1994), at
1178^1179 (J. Wald, dissenting) (citing Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 United States
Reports (US) 480 (1983), at 486).
7 337 F.3d, at 965.
8 Altmann,124 S. Ct, at 2254.
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nevertheless useful, for purposes of assessing the Supreme Court’s resolution
of the retroactivity issue, to clarify the pre-FSIA approach. At that time, the
courts deferred to Executive Branch’s case-specific recommendations in favour
of immunity.9 If the Executive Branch did not advance a suggestion of immu-
nity, however, the court would make its own determination on the availability
of immunity in the particular context, applying the ‘principles’ of immunity
that ‘it is the established policy of the department to recognize’.10 In 1948, the
‘established policy’ of the Executive Branch was to recognize the absolute
theory of immunity. In 1952, the Executive Branch announced in the Tate
Letter that it was adhering to the restrictive theory as recognized in interna-
tional law, under which foreign states would enjoy immunity for their public
acts, but not for their private or commercial acts.11 The Tate Letter did not
insulate the Department from pressure to suggest immunity in particular
cases where the immunity was not warranted under the restrictive theory.12
The fact that suggestions of immunity were sometimes made in cases based on
private acts proved problematic.13 The FSIAwas enacted to take the issue from
the State Department and place it in the hands of the courts ö a move that the
State Department favoured, as it would relieve it of a significant burden.14 The
Act codified the restrictive theory of immunity and added some exceptions not
previously recognized. According to the US government, in its amicus filing in
Altmann, the exception for takings of property in violation of international law
was among the new exceptions recognized in the FSIA.15 Thus, both before
and after the Tate Letter, a foreign state would have received immunity with
respect to claims of a taking of property in violation of international law if the
taking was effectuated through public, non-commercial acts.16
9 See, e.g. Compania Espanola De NavegacionMaritima, S. A. v.The Navemar,303US 68 (1938), at 74.
10 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 US 30 (1945), at 35^36.
11 1952 Tate Letter, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 US 682 (1976), at 713.
12 SeeVerlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461US 480 (1983), at 487.
13 See ibid. (‘F]oreign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department in seek-
ing immunity [and o]n occasion, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity in
cases where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive theory.’).
14 Ibid., at 488 (‘Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in order to free the [State
Department] from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures.’).
15 Brief of the USA as Amicus Curiae in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, at 7.
16 In concluding that the State Department would have recommended no immunity for the
defendants in 1948, the Court of Appeals relied on a different letter from Jack B. Tate, this one
known as the Bernstein Letter. In it,Tate stated that ‘[t]he policy of the Executive, with respect
to claims asserted in the USA for the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation in
lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany,
is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials’, letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor,
Department of State, to the Attorneys for the plaintiff in Civil Action No. 31^555 (SDNY)
reprinted in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), at 376
(per curiam). This letter, however, addressed the act-of-state doctrine, not the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity. Even in this more limited context of the act-of-state doctrine, the use
of Bernstein Letters has been controversial. When the Supreme Court directly confronted a
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The Supreme Court’s decision to resolve the retroactivity issue in Altmann
reflects its view, or at least its assumption, that the defendants would have
enjoyed immunity under the pre-FSIA approach, presumably because there
was no recognized exception for takings of property in violation of interna-
tional law in 1948. To resolve the question, the Court applied the retroactivity
analysis that it had previously articulated in Landgraf v. USI Film Products.17
Under Landgraf, the retroactive application of statutes is disfavoured. But a key
insight of Landgraf is that not every application of a statute to primary conduct
that occurred before the statute’s enactment is a ‘retroactive’ application of the
statute.Whether or not such application would be retroactive turns on whether
the law at issue regulates substance or procedure. It would constitute a retro-
active application if, for example, ‘it would impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new
duties with respect to transactions already completed’.18 When a statute’s
operation is procedural, on the other hand, its application to a case brought
after its enactment is not a retroactive application, even if the suit is based on
events that occurred before the Statute’s enactment.19 That is because the
Statute is designed to regulate the judicial proceeding and, accordingly, to
apply the Statute to judicial proceedings taking place after its enactment is
to apply it prospectively.
Although retroactive application of statutes is disfavoured under Landgraf,
the Court recognized that Congress has the power to enact retroactive statutes.
Thus, even if application of a statute to a case involving pre-enactment conduct
would qualify as a retroactive application of the statute, such application is
required if the statute itself clearly states that it is to be applied in such cases.
But, in the absence of a clear statement, a statute will be construed not to
apply to such conduct where such application would amount to a retroactive
application of the statute.
The FSIA’s preamble provides that ‘[c]laims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by the courts of the United States and of the
Bernstein Letter for the first (and only) time, a solid majority concluded that the courts should
not regard it as binding. Although Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 US 398 (1964), concluded that the courts should defer to
such letters, the dissenters stronglyobjected to such deference on separation-of-powers grounds,
ibid., at 792^793 (J. Brennan, dissenting) as did Justices Douglas, ibid., at 772^773 (J. Douglas,
concurring in the judgment) and Powell, ibid., at 773 (J. Powell, concurring in the judgment). In
the words of Justice Douglas, ‘unquestioning judicial deference to the Executive’ would convert
the courts into‘a mere errand boy for the Executive Branchwhich may choose to pick some peo-
ple’s chestnuts from the fire, but not others’, ibid., at 773, note 4 (J. Douglas, concurring in the
judgment).
17 511US 244 (1994).
18 Landgraf, 511US, at 280.
19 Altmann, 124 S. Ct, at 2250^2251; see also ibid., at 2256 (J. Scalia, concurring). For Justice
Scalia, such statutes address the limits of judicial power and jurisdiction, not substantive
rights. ‘Therefore, the relevant analysis is not when the underlying conduct occurred, but
when the judicial power was invoked.’, ibid., at 2256.
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States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter’.20 The Justices
were unanimous in concluding that this statement did not control the question
of the Statute’s temporal reach. The majority said that the statement ‘by itself
falls short of an ‘‘expres[s] prescri[ption] of the statute’s proper reach’’’.21 It is
not entirely clear why. Had the majority found the provision controlling, it
could have avoided thorny issues concerning the nature of foreign sovereign
immunity. In its later analysis, the Court cited this language as the most
important of several grounds for concluding that the FSIA applies to cases
based on pre-enactment conduct. The majority there described the language
as an ‘unambiguous’ statement that courts in cases arising after the Statute’s
effective date were to apply the FSIA’s standards in resolving claims of foreign
sovereign immunity. As Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent, if the language of
the preamble was unambiguous, that should have been the end of the analysis.
The majority’s approach suggests that an unambiguous statement about the
Statute’s temporal reach is insufficient to overcome the presumption against
retroactive application of statutes. Apparently, a super-clear statement is
required.22
3. The Procedural or Substantive Nature
of the FSIA
Having found no sufficiently clear statement, the majority found it necessary
to consider whether the application of the FSIA’s exceptions to a lawsuit
brought after the FSIA’s effective date, and based on conduct that took place
before its effective date, constituted a retroactive application of the law.
The answer, according to the majority, turned on whether the FSIA ‘affects
substantive rights’ or ‘addresses only matters of procedure’. In the view of
the majority, the Act defied categorization. The majority found some support
20 28 USC, x1602.
21 Altmann, 124 S. Ct, at 2251 (quoting Landgraf, 511US, at 261^262).
22 Perhaps the majority’s failure to rest on the ‘unambiguous’ language from the preamble
stemmed from the view of two of its members that the language was not in fact unambiguous.
Justices Breyer and Souter agreed with the dissenters that ‘there is no logical inconsistency
between an act that applies ‘‘henceforth’’ and a reading of x1605(a)(3) that limits it to ‘‘rights
in property taken after this Act came into force’’’, (Altmann, 124 S. Ct, at 2258^2259 (J. Breyer,
concurring) (emphasis in original)). The concurring Justices seem to engage here in a form of
temporal renvoi, interpreting the temporal reference in the preamble to be subject to any
temporal limitation found in more specific provisions of the statute. There might have been
something to be said for that approach had the other provision included a temporal limitation,
but s. 1605(a)(3) does not. Section 1605(a)(3) is not in terms limited to rights in property
taken after the FSIA’s entry into force. The preamble does address the FSIA’s temporal scope,
and it says that it applies to ‘claims of immunity’ made after the FSIA’s entry into force.
There accordingly appears to have been no good reason not to obviate the inconclusive
Landgraf analysis by treating the language in the preamble as a clear statement about
the temporal scope of the FSIA.
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for characterizing the immunity as procedural, and some support for charac-
terizing the immunity as substantive. Since Landgraf’s substance-procedure
test was thus inconclusive, the majority found it necessary to rest its deter-
mination of the FSIA’s retroactivity on other factors, most importantly the
unambiguous language in the preamble. It does not appear to have occurred
to the Court that foreign sovereign immunity could be both substantive and
procedural. A foreign state’s immunity could, in theory, offer the state a present
protection from the burdens of litigation and a substantive protection from
being subjected to liability to private parties. If so, then a state’s entitlement to
protection from the burdens of litigation should be determined by the law at
the time at which the lawsuit is brought, while its protection from substantive
liability to private parties should be determined by the law as it existed at the
time of the events that are alleged to have given rise to liability. The majority’s
recognition that there was support for both characterizations supports
the conclusion that foreign sovereign immunity provides foreign states with
both forms of immunity. There is, indeed, substantial support not cited by
the Court for concluding that foreign sovereign immunity is both an immunity
from judicial jurisdiction and an immunity from substantive liability.
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity as a Procedural Immunity
The majority found support for the conclusion that the Act was procedural in
the proposition that, before the FSIA’s enactment, foreign states had an expec-
tation of immunity as a matter of comity, but that ‘they had no ‘‘right’’ to such
immunity’.23 On this point, the majority’s argument is both flawed and beside
the point. If the majority meant that foreign states had no legal expectation
that they would be accorded such immunity, the majority distorted the autho-
rities it cited and misunderstood the nature of the immunity. Earlier in
the opinion, the majority accurately paraphrased its statement in Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria that Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner
Exchange had ‘made clear [that] foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of
grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed
by the Constitution’.24 To say that it is not required by the Constitution, however,
is not to say that it is not a ‘right’. Moreover, even if foreign sovereign immunity
was a matter of grace and comity at the time of Marshall’s opinion in
The Schooner Exchange, it had ripened into an entitlement under customary
international law by the late 19th century, and clearly had that status by
the early 20th century.25 The emergence of the restrictive theory diminished
23 Altmann, 124 S. Ct, at 2251 (‘Prior to 1976 foreign states had a justifiable expectation that,
as a matter of comity, United States courts would grant them immunity for their public
acts . . ., but they had no ‘‘right’’ to such immunity.’).
24 461US 480 (1983), at 486 (emphasis added).
25 See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, x42 (1965); 1952 Tate Letter, reprinted
in Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 US 682 (1976), at 711 (discussing the history and
evolution of sovereign immunity in international law).
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the scope of the entitlement but did not affect its status as an entitlement
where it continued to apply. In any event, whether the immunity is a matter
of comity or a matter of legal right has nothing to do with whether the
immunity is a matter of substance or procedure.
More to the point, the majority found support for characterizing foreign
sovereign immunity as procedural in its perception that the Act does not
increase states’ liability for past conduct or impose new duties for transactions
already concluded. However, the majority did not explain the basis of this
perception or cite any authority in support of this understanding of state
immunity. One might have said that the Act imposed new liabilities on states
by removing their immunity. This conclusion would have been consistent with
the Court’s holding in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer that a
statute that confers jurisdiction where previously there was none is substan-
tive for retroactivity purposes.26 This reasoning was persuasive to Justice
Kennedy in dissent.27
For reasons not mentioned by the Court, it is absolutely clear that a foreign
state’s immunity is a procedural immunity, providing foreign states with a
present protection from the burdens of litigation. The Court need only have
considered why the defendants were permitted to appeal against the district
court’s denial of their motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The
denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory decision usually not subject to
immediate appeal.28 There is a recognized exception, however, where the court
has denied a motion based on an immunity that protects the defendant not
merely from substantive liability but also from the burdens of litigation. On this
basis, the Supreme Court has recognized a state’s right to pursue an immediate
appeal of the denial of its Eleventh Amendment immunity29 and a government
official’s right to pursue the immediate appeal of the denial of his official
immunity.30 The Supreme Court’s decision to reach the retroactivity issue in
Altmann is an implicit acceptance of this rationale for permitting interlocutory
appeals of denials of motions to dismiss on the ground of foreign sovereign
immunity. The decision to allow the appeal was thus itself a reflection of the
immunity’s status as a present protection from the burdens of suit.
26 Altmann, 124 S. Ct, at 2251, citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 US
939 (1997), at 951.
27 Altmann, 124 S. Ct, at 226 (J. Kennedy, dissenting).
28 The courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over final decisions, 28 USC, x1291.
29 Puerto RicoAqueduct & SewerAuth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 US 139 (1993).
30 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 US 511 (1985). It is precisely for this reason that the Courts of Appeals
have unanimously held that a foreign state is entitled to pursue an immediate appeal against
the denial of its motion to dismiss a suit on the ground of foreign sovereign immunity. (See, e.g.
I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., 351 F.3d 1184 (DC Cir. 2003), at 1185; Filler v.
Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213 (2nd Cir. 2004), at 216; Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Indus. de
Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1999), at 381; Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. v.
United States Dist. Court, 859 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988), at 1356; Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney, 853 F.2d
445 (11th Cir. 1988), at 450.)
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The Court was thus on solid ground in believing that foreign sovereign
immunity provides foreign states with a present protection from the burdens
of litigation. Its mistake was its apparent assumption that the immunity had to
be either substantive or procedural. It could be both.
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunity as a Substantive Immunity
The majority also found some support for characterizing sovereign immunity
as substantive, but, again, it overlooked the most persuasive support.
While recognizing that Hughes Aircraft supported characterization of the
immunity as substantive, the majority attempted in a footnote to distinguish
the statute in Hughes Aircraft on the ground that it prescribed a jurisdictional
limitation that any court entertaining the cause of action was bound to apply.
Suits against foreign states barred from the state and federal courts by the
FSIA, on the other hand, could still be entertained in foreign courts. The
availability of foreign courts, in the majority’s view, made the FSIA more like
the jurisdictional rules characterized in Landgraf as procedural because they
determine which court may entertain an action, rather than whether the action
may be maintained at all.31
The majority overlooked the fact that the FSIA purported to be largely a
codification of international law principles of immunity, applicable equally in
all nations.32 To the extent that the FSIA did codify existing international law,
the conclusion that a suit was barred by the FSIA would mean that the suit
would be likewise barred in the courts of other states (if those states complied
with their obligations under international law). The FSIA admittedly departed
from international law in some respects, but, insofar as relevant to this case, its
departure took the form of allowing suits to proceed in US courts where no
exception to foreign sovereign immunity had been recognized in international
law.33 In such a case, also, a determination that a suit was barred by the FSIA
would mean that the suit could not be brought in foreign countries that
adhered to their international obligations.34
31 The dissenters insisted that, for purposes of answering this question, only courts in the USA
should be considered, as ‘the task of canvassing what causes of action foreign countries might
have allowed before a new jurisdictional regime made such suits also viable in American
courts would be a most difficult task to assign American courts’, 124 S. Ct, at 2272. The lower
courts beforeAltmann also limited this inquiry to US courts; seeAbrams v. Socie¤ te¤ Nationale des
Chemins de Fer Franc° ais, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003), at 186, vacated and remanded, 124 S.
Ct 2834 (2004).
32 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33 In at least one respect, the FSIA changed prior law by expanding the protections afforded to
foreign state entities. Section 1602 defines ‘foreign state’ to include corporations a majority or
more of whose shares are owned by a foreign state. It appears that, under prior law, separately
incorporated entities were not treated as foreign state instrumentalities; see discussion infra.
34 Two arguments in favour of retroactivity advanced by Justice Breyer become less probative of
the issue when considered in the light of the evolution of international law principles of
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The majority also cited as support for characterizing sovereign immunity
as substantive the statement inVerlinden that the FSIA is not simply a jurisdic-
tional statute, but a codification of ‘the standards governing foreign sovereign
immunity as a matter of substantive federal law’.35 The Court in that case
was considering whether the FSIA’s extension of federal jurisdiction to
cases between aliens and foreign states comported with the Constitution’s
limitations. The Court held that all cases against foreign states fell within the
constitutional provision authorizing federal jurisdiction in cases ‘arising
under’ federal law,36 reasoning that all such cases required application of the
federal law of foreign sovereign immunity. If foreign sovereign immunity had
merely been a jurisdictional matter, then the courts’ conclusion that the need
to apply the law of sovereign immunity sufficed to confer federal jurisdiction
would have amounted to bootstrapping. The Court avoided this problem
by characterizing the immunity as ‘substantive’, citing in particular the fact
that such immunity applied equally in state and federal courts.37 The view
that foreign sovereign immunity was a substantive immunity had also been
expressed by the Supreme Court in other cases not cited by the Court in
Altmann. For example, in Ex parte Republic of Peru, the Court had said that the
question of sovereign immunity did not have to do with ‘whether there was
jurisdiction in the district court, but whether the jurisdiction which the court
had already acquired by seizure of the vessel should have been relinquished
in conformity to an overriding principle of substantive law’.38
foreign sovereign immunity. First, Justice Breyer notes that the FSIAwas applied immediately
after its enactment to permit suits against foreign states falling into one of the FSIA’s exceptions,
124 S. Ct, at 2260 (citingVerlinden). But these cases involved the commercial-activities exception,
which the USA adhered to when it issued theTate Letter in 1952. Secondly, Justice Breyer notes
that the Tate Letter itself was applied retroactively to permit suits based on conduct that pre-
dated its issuance,124 S. Ct, at 2260. But this disregards the fact that theTate Letter purported
to be an interpretation of existing customary international law. The USAwas, in fact, among the
slowest to embrace formally the restrictive theory of international law which, according to the
Tate Letter itself, had ripened into a rule of customary international law some time before.
35 Altmann, 124 S. Ct, at 2251 (quotingVerlinden, 461US, at 496^497).
36 US Constitution, Art. III, x2.
37 Verlinden, 461US, at 497.
38 318 US 578, at 588. There is additional case support, overlooked by the Court, for the proposi-
tion that the immunity enjoyed by a sovereign is a substantive immunity. In the closely
analogous context of the immunity of the USA, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that, when sovereign immunity applies, it prevents a liability from attaching in the first place.
This was the holding of TheWestern Maid (257 US 419 (1922)) in which the Court, speaking
though Justice Holmes, dismissed on the merits a libel against ships that had caused injuries
while they were owned and operated by the USA, even though the ships were no longer
operated by the USA and thus no longer beyond the reach of legal process. The Court held
that, as a result of the immunity enjoyed by the USA, no liability attached when the
ships caused the injury. In the view of the Court, ‘[l]egal obligations that exist but cannot be
enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp.’ (ibid., at 433).
A similar scepticism about the existence of substantive legal liabilities when no courts have
jurisdiction to entertain claims to enforce such liabilities seems to underlie the conclusion in
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Characterization of foreign sovereign immunity as a substantive immunity
is also strongly supported by the fact that the presence or absence of immunity
under the FSIA turns on the nature of the foreign state’s conduct that is the
subject of the lawsuit. The fact that a state’s entitlement to immunity turns on
the nature of the conduct of the state that gave rise to the dispute suggests
strongly that foreign sovereign immunity is immunity ratione materiae, which
is generally thought to be substantive, not merely procedural. This conclusion
is supported further by an examination of the nature of foreign sovereign
immunity under international law. The restrictive theory of immunity, which
the FSIA sought to codify, seems to reflect the understanding that the public
acts of a state should not be scrutinized by municipal courts under the laws
applicable to private parties, which are the laws that national courts generally
apply, but instead in international fora under international law. The evolution
of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity might thus be under-
stood as an extension to the commercial activities of foreign states of the law
applicable to private parties in their commercial dealings.39 On this view, the
evolution of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity imposed a
substantive liability on states that they did not have before.40
While recognizing that there was support for characterizing foreign sover-
eign immunity as substantive, the majority also cited evidence that such
immunity is not substantive. Thus, the majority noted that the FSIA does not
increase foreign states’ liability for past conduct.41Also, suggesting that foreign
Hughes Aircraft that a statute that creates jurisdiction where none existed before is substantive
for purposes of retroactivity analysis.
39 For elaboration, see C. M. Va¤ zquez, ‘Comment.Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria: Federal
Jurisdiction Over Cases Between Aliens and Foreign States’, 82 Colum. L. Rev. (1982), at 1057,
1078^1080 and notes 106^108.
40 See also infra note 41 (discussing s. 1608). It is true that certain provisions of the FSIA,
including the provision at issue in Altmann itself, contemplate suits against foreign states
based not on national law but on international law. With respect to cases falling within
exceptions of this sort, it might be contended that the Act does not extend to states substantive
laws that had not previously applied to them; rather, this exception simply opens up the US
courts to enforce laws that applied to the states all along. If so, then perhaps the question of
whether the FSIA is substantive or merely procedural would have to be addressed exception by
exception.
41 Ibid., at 2251. Although the majority did not cite anything for this proposition, it may have had
in mind the indication in the legislative history that the FSIA does not affect the substantive
law of liability (H.R. Rep. No. 94^1487, p. 12 (1976) (‘The [FSIA] is not intended to affect the
substantive law of liability.’). This statement might be understood to indicate that the immunity
of foreign states is not an immunity from the substantive laws regulating private parties.
But the FSIA could be read differently. Section 1608 provides that if a foreign state is not
entitled to immunity under s. 1605, it shall be liable to the same extent as a private party
under like circumstances (28 USC, x1608). Consistent with a substantive conception of foreign
sovereign immunity, this provision could be read to contemplate that immune foreign states
are beyond the reach of substantive laws that regulate private parties, but foreign states that
are not immune under s. 1605 are made subject by s. 1608 to the laws that would otherwise
apply to private parties in like circumstances. On this view, s. 1608 would be the substantive
counterpart to s. 1605; the two provisions would operate in tandem to extend judicial jurisdic-
tion and substantive liability to foreign states with respect to conduct falling within one of the
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sovereign immunity is not a substantive immunity was the Court’s very recent
decision in Dole Foods v. Patrickson.42 The Court there had to determine
whether the defendant corporation’s privatization affected its entitlement to
sovereign immunity. The corporation claimed that it was entitled to immunity
because it was a foreign state instrumentality at the time of the events giving
rise to the lawsuit. The Court held that the corporation’s entitlement to immu-
nity was to be determined by its status at the time at which suit was brought
because, unlike the doctrine that makes the President ‘immune from liability
for official actions taken during his time in office, even against a suit filed
when he was no longer serving in that capacity’, the FSIA merely ‘give[s]
foreign states and their instrumentalities some protection from the incon-
venience of suit as a gesture of comity between the United States and other
sovereigns’.43 If this was indeed the basis of the holding in Patrickson, the Court
had already decided the central issue in Altmann.44 But the Court in Patrickson
provided no support for its statement that the FSIA merely provides ‘some
protection from the inconvenience of suit’.45 As noted above, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity does at least that, but other authorities, unmentioned
by the Court in Patrickson and Altmann, suggest strongly that the immunity
does more than that.46
Justice Breyer, concurring in Altmann, appeared to regard the immunity of
heads of state ö which the Court in Patrickson regarded as an ‘immunity from
liability’ ö as closely analogous to the immunity of the state itself.47 He cited
foreign decisions involving head-of-state immunity for the proposition that a
head of state enjoys immunity ratione personae, which ceases to exist when the
head of state leaves office.48 He overlooked the fact, recognized in one of the
cases that he cited, that a head of state retains an immunity ratione materiae,
protecting him from being sued with respect to public acts even after he leaves
office.49 Heads of state thus enjoy ‘immunity from liability’, as recognized by
exceptions specified in theAct.When a state is entitled to immunity, however, it does not incur a
liability.
42 538 US 468 (2003).
43 Ibid., at 479 (citingVerlinden, 461US, at 486).
44 The author of the opinion in Patrickson (Justice Kennedy) did not seem to think so, however, as
he wrote the dissenting opinion in Altmann.
45 The Court cited Verlinden for the proposition that the FSIA offers ‘protection from the incon-
venience of suit as a gesture of comity between the United States and other sovereigns’. The
citation to Verlinden appears to be for the proposition that the protection afforded to foreign
sovereigns is afforded as a matter of comity. On this question, see supra notes 23^25, and
accompanying text. On the question of whether the protection offered is merely a protection
from the inconvenience of suit,Verlinden cuts the other way, in light of its description of such
protection as ‘substantive’.
46 E.g. TheWestern Maid, discussed supra note 38.
47 See 124 S. Ct, at 2259 (J. Breyer, concurring) (discussing foreign cases regarding head-of-state
immunity).
48 124 S. Ct, at 2259.
49 See Queen v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte)
[2000] 1 Law Reports: Appeal Cases 147, at 202 (1999) (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson)
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the Court in Patrickson with respect to the President of the United States.
If foreign sovereign immunity is analogous to head-of-state immunity, the
Court should have concluded that foreign sovereign immunity is similarly an
immunity from liability and thus substantive.50
Finally, the majority’s discussion of the act-of-state doctrine indicates
that the majority did not regard foreign sovereign immunity as substantive.
According to the majority, ‘[u]nlike a claim of sovereign immunity, which
merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides foreign
states with a substantive defense on the merits’.51 The Court thus appears to
have viewed the act-of-state doctrine as the substantive counterpart to
the jurisdictional protection afforded by the FSIA. Congress, in enacting the
FSIA, did not intend to lift the protections afforded by the act-of-state doctrine.
Thus, it is possible that a suit might be within the jurisdiction of the US courts
because it falls within one of the FSIA’s exceptions, yet has to be dismissed
because of the act-of-state doctrine. As described by the Court, the act-of-state
doctrine generally prohibits ‘the courts of one state [from] question[ing] the
validity of public acts (acts jure imperii) performed by other sovereigns within
their own borders’.52 Noting that the act-of-state doctrine is unaffected by the
FSIA, and thus continues to protect the foreign state to the extent that it
protected them before, the Court concluded that applying the FSIA to this
case would not unsettle expectations and thus would not constitute a retro-
active application of law.
It is true that foreign states would continue to be protected on the merits to
the extent that the act-of-state doctrine applies, but the protection afforded by
the act-of-state doctrine is narrower than that afforded by foreign sovereign
immunity. For example, the act-of-state doctrine only applies to
conduct performed in the foreign state’s own territory, whereas foreign sover-
eign immunity protects states with respect to actions taking place outside its
territory.53 If the latter immunity, before it was restricted by the FSIA or the
evolution of customary international law, was an immunity from liability, then
applying an exception to immunity for acts that occurred before the adoption
of the exception would constitute a retroactive application of the law. Although
the act-of-state doctrine does reduce the significance of the Court’s holding,
it does not obviate the issue with which the Court was confronted in Altmann.
(acknowledging that a former head of state enjoys ‘continuing partial immunity . . .after
leaving [his] post.’).
50 For an argument that the immunity of states of the Union is an immunity from liability, see
C. M. Va¤ zquez, ‘What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?’, 106 Yale Law Journal (Yale LJ) 1683
(1997). For the claim that the Supreme Court has now accepted this view of the state’s sover-
eign immunity, see C. M. Va¤ zquez, ‘Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy’,
109 Yale LJ 1927 (2000).
51 124 S. Ct, at 2254.
52 Ibid.
53 SeeArgentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 US 428 (1989), at 439 (Argentina enjoys immunity
with respect to acts taken on the high seas).
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Despite some indications that the Court did not view foreign sovereign
immunity as a substantive immunity, its conclusion that the Landgraf
substance-procedure test was inconclusive and its substitution of a different
test suggest that the Court in the end did not reach a firm conclusion on
whether the immunity enjoyed by foreign sovereigns is a substantive or pro-
cedural one. The majority’s opinion is best read as not categorizing as either
substantive or procedural an immunity that ‘defies such categorization’.54 The
decision is thus consistent with the view that foreign states that enjoy immu-
nity under the FSIA enjoy both a procedural and a substantive immunity.
4. The Court’s Substitute Test
Having found the Landgraf substance-procedure test to be inconclusive, the
Court proceeded to announce a substitute test. It held that the Landgraf
presumption applies with less force when private rights are not in issue.55
In such cases, Congress’s most recent expression of policy should be applied
unless there is something in the Statute or the circumstances surrounding
its enactment to indicate that Congress did not want it applied to cases involv-
ing past conduct.56 The Court found no such indications, and found much
evidence that Congress did want the Statute applied to cases based on past
conduct.
First, the majority found in the language of the preamble an ‘unambiguous’
indication of Congress’s intent that the FSIA be applied to suits brought after its
enactment. It thus appears that statutory language not clear enough to meet
Landgraf’s requirement of a clear statement might still be probative of congres-
sional intent that the Statute be applied retroactively in cases not involving
private rights.
The Court also relied on the fact that the FSIA includes a number of clearly
procedural provisions that apply to suits based on past conduct.57 In light
of these provisions, the Court concluded, it would be ‘anomalous to presume
that an isolated provision (such as the expropriation exception . . .) is of
purely prospective application’.58 This point led the Court to its final reasons
for its holding. According to the Court, concluding that the FSIA as a whole
applies to lawsuits commenced after its enactment, regardless of when the
conduct underlying the claim occurred, ‘is most consistent with two of the
Act’s principal purposes: clarifying the rules that judges should apply in
54 124 S. Ct, at 2251.
55 124 S. Ct, at 2252.
56 Ibid.
57 The Court cited the provisions regarding venue, removal, execution and attachment, 124
S. Ct, at 2253.
58 Ibid.
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resolving sovereign immunity claims and eliminating political participation
in the resolution of such claims’.59
The first purpose is advanced by the Court’s articulation of an easily admin-
istrable rule with no ‘anomalous’ exceptions. All courts now know, the Court
seemed to say, that they should resolve foreign sovereign immunity claims by
applying current law, no matter when the claims accrued. It is true that the
Court’s holding makes life easier for judges in cases involving foreign sover-
eigns. However, it is probably not the case that all issues in sovereign immu-
nity claims are to be decided under current law. For example, the provision at
issue in Altmann permits suits based on takings of property in violation of
international law. The Court has clarified that this exception does provide a
basis for suing foreign states based on conduct that occurred before the FSIA’s
enactment, even though the exception did not exist at the time of the events
underlying the suit. Nevertheless, in determining whether the taking violated
international law, presumably the court would have to apply the rules of inter-
national law as they existed at the time of the events alleged to constitute
the taking.
Additionally, it is unclear whether current law would govern in cases in
which the FSIA broadened the protections of foreign states. For example, in
Abrams v. Socie¤ te¤ Nationale des Chemins de Fer, the defendant was a corporation
wholly owned by France, being sued for transporting Jews and others from
occupied France to their deaths in Nazi gas chambers during World War II.60
The defendants argued that they were foreign state instrumentalities, as that
term is defined in the FSIA, and were thus entitled to the immunities of such
instrumentalities.61 The plaintiffs argued that before the FSIA’s enactment,
separately incorporated entities owned by foreign states were not regarded
as foreign state instrumentalities.62 The district court ruled in favour of the
defendants,63 but the US Court of Appeals vacated and remanded that deci-
sion.64 The Supreme Court, in turn, vacated and remanded the Court of
Appeals’ judgment for reconsideration in the light of Altmann.65 If the plaintiffs
were right in their description of pre-FSIA law, the effect of the FSIA on this
particular issue was to expand the protections of foreign state entities. The
Court’s claim in Altmann that it was ‘clarifying’ the law and avoiding the
‘anomaly’ of statutes with provisions’ having different temporal scope suggests
that the new definition should be applied to these old facts. The US Court of
Appeals reached that conclusion in its post-Altmann decision on remand.66
However, as noted, the Supreme Court in Altmann based its retroactivity
59 Ibid.
60 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded; 124 S. Ct 2834 (2004).
61 332 F.3d, at 179^180.
62 Ibid., at 180.
63 Ibid., at 174.
64 Ibid., at 188.
65 124 S. Ct 2834 (2004).
66 Abrams v. Socie¤ te¤ Nationale des Chemin de Fer Franc° ais, 389 F.3d 61 (2004).
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holding in part on its view because it believed that the presumption against
retroactivity should be relaxed when private rights are not at stake. An expan-
sion of foreign sovereign immunity amounts to a diminution of private rights.
It is thus arguable that Altmann requires a different retroactivity analysis
where the FSIA broadened the immunity of foreign states.
Nor is it clear that a contrary holding in Altmann ö requiring the applica-
tion of the law that prevailed at the time of the events in resolving substantive
issues such as the extent of a state’s liability ö would have been difficult to
administer. Certain exceptions to immunity were introduced in the FSIA and
thus would apply only if the case is based on events that took place after 1976.
The commercial-activities exception is a codification of the restrictive theory
of foreign sovereign immunity, to which the United States adhered in 1952.
It would accordingly be reasonable to hold that this exception applies only
to conduct that took place after that date. That is, in fact, the approach
that had been taken by most of the lower courts before Altmann, which had
dismissed suits brought under the commercial-activities exception based on
conduct that took place well before the United States adopted the restrictive
theory.67
The Court appears to have regarded the pre-FSIA approach as inadmin-
istrable because of the role played by the Executive. This is suggested by the
Court’s reliance on Congress’s intent to ‘eliminate political participation’ in
resolving such disputes. As noted, however, the role of the Executive after the
issuance of the Tate Letter was limited to suggesting immunity in circum-
stances where it was not warranted under the restrictive theory.68 Congress
clearly intended to eliminate this role when it enacted the FSIA. The Court
could easily have given effect to that aspect of Congress’s intent while holding
that substantive sovereign immunity claims should be decided by applying
the general principles of sovereign immunity recognized by the United States
at the time at which the cause of action arose. State Department suggestions
of immunity in pre-FSIA cases not warranting immunity under general prin-
ciples of law would obviously have been based on foreign policy considerations
that most likely would not be relevant today. Because courts cannot be asked to
replicate such foreign policy analyses, and because foreign states could not
have had a legitimate expectation that they would be afforded immunity
under circumstances not warranting it under the law, it would have been
eminently reasonable to apply to disputes accruing before the enactment of
the FSIA the law that prevailed at that time, but without the foreign policy
overlay that might have given foreign states additional protection if the
Executive Branch had suggested immunity.
67 See, e.g. Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 480 US 917 (1987); Carl Marks & Co. v. USSR, 841
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988); cert. denied 487 US 1219; Slade v. Mexico, 617 F.Supp 351 (DDC 1985); cert.
denied 479 US 1032.
68 Supra notes 9^10 and accompanying text.
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In the light of its recognition that Congress intended to ‘eliminate political
participation in the resolution of [foreign sovereign immunity] claims’,69
perhaps the strangest part of the majority’s opinion was its statement that
‘nothing in our holding prevents the State Department from filing statements
of interest suggesting that courts decline to exercise jurisdiction in particular
cases implicating foreign sovereign immunity’,70 and that the Executive
Branch’s opinion ‘might well be entitled to deference as the considered judg-
ment of the Executive on a matter of foreign policy’.71As the dissenting opinion
notes, the Court here introduced the very uncertainty in the decision of foreign
sovereign immunity claims that it had adopted its bright-line rule to avoid.72
In the end, the Court left open the question of ‘whether such deference should
be granted in cases covered by the FSIA’.73 Given Congress’s purpose of elim-
inating political considerations from the sovereign immunity determination, it
would be astounding if the Court found such deference appropriate. The Court’s
invitation of such statements, however, introduces additional uncertainty into
this area of the law, in contravention of Congress and the Court’s apparent
intent to reduce such ambiguities.
5. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Altmann simplified somewhat the law of foreign sover-
eign immunity in the United States by holding that the FSIA’s provisions
are generally applicable to lawsuits commenced after its effective date, even if
the suits involve claims that accrued before its enactment. The Court based
its decision on statutory text addressing the retroactivity issue, as well as
Congress’s intent to clarify the law (which the Court interpreted as a preference
for an easily administrable rule) and its intent to eliminate political consid-
erations from the foreign sovereign immunity determination. Given its inter-
pretation of the preamble as an ‘unambiguous’ indication of Congress’s intent
regarding retroactivity, the Court could have reached its decision without
its unsatisfying and ultimately inconclusive discussion of whether foreign
sovereign immunity is substantive or procedural.
The Court’s holding is, of course, relevant only for cases based on conduct
that took place before the FSIA’s enactment. Although such cases are not likely
to be numerous, there are several such cases pending, some of them, like
Altmann, raising claims based on conduct during and immediately after
World War II, many involving alleged war crimes.74 The applicability of the
69 Ibid., at 2253.
70 124 S. Ct, at 2255.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., at 2263^2264 (J. Kennedy, dissenting).
73 Ibid., at 2255^2256.
74 See Abrams, 389 F.3d 61 (2004);. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679 (DC Cir. 2003),
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Altmann, 124 S. Ct 2835 (2004);
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FSIA having been decided with respect to most of these claims, the lawsuits
may now proceed to other threshold issues, such as whether the suit falls
within one of the FSIA’s exceptions (a question left unaddressed by the
Supreme Court in Altmann), whether the statute of limitations has run75 or
whether the claims were extinguished by the treaties that formally ended the
war.76 And, notwithstanding the US Court of Appeals’ decision on remand in
Abrams, there may yet be retroactivity issues to resolve where the FSIA is
alleged to have broadened the protections afforded to foreign states.77
Republic of Austria v.Whiteman, 72 Fed. Appx. 850 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Altmann,124 S. Ct 2835 (2004); Republic of Poland v. Garb, 72 Fed.
Appx. 850 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Altmann, 124 S.
Ct 2835 (2004); Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG,379 F.3d1227 (11th Cir. 2004).
75 See Cruz v. U.S., No. C 01^00892 CRB, slip. op. at 5 (ND Cal. June 24, 2003) (granting plaintiffs
leave to amend their complaint to plead entitlement to an equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (DC Cir. 1994), at 1168^1170.
76 See Joo, 332 F.3d 679; Haven v. Polska, 215 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2000), at 730^731.
77 SeeAbrams, supra note 66, and accompanying text.
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